Let’s look at each of these categories in turn.
  1. Neural correlates of consciousness and “signatures of consciousness”
The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have received the most scientific attention as a means for assessing the presence and type of consciousness. This term seems to have been coined by Crick and Koch as part of their quest to determine what parts of the brain are necessary and sufficient for conscious experience (Crick and Koch 1990; Koch 2004; Koch 2019).
When, for example, determining whether a vegetative patient is conscious in any way, we can and do examine the neural correlates of consciousness only, since there aren’t any behaviors to observe and no creative products either. Various researchers have proposed tests for cognition and consciousness in coma and vegetative patients.
What’s physically going on in the brain in such cases? Neuroimaging tools such as EEG, MEG, fMRI and TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation), each with their own strengths and weaknesses, are able to provide information on activity happening within the brain even in coma and vegetative patients.
Dehaene and his colleagues have identified four “signatures of consciousness,” which extend the idea of neural correlates of consciousness to more specific aspects of brain activity that are necessary for conscious awareness, rather than only being correlated with consciousness (this distinction, however, may be a misunderstanding of Koch’s definition of NCC since Koch’s definition is just this). Dehaene focuses on what’s known as the “P3 wave,” which is the positive electric field (measured with EEG) that occurs about 300 milliseconds in the dorsolateral cortex, after a sufficiently strong stimulus, as the single most important signature of consciousness in humans. In cortex where stimuli don’t result in a P3 wave, Dehaene et al. suggest that this activity does not reach the level of consciousness. In tests of vegetative and minimally conscious patients, he and his colleagues have successfully predicted which patients are most likely to regain more normal states of consciousness.
Sid Kouider, another French neuroscientist, has examined very young babies in order to assess the likelihood of them being conscious, using a similar set of signatures of consciousness as Dehaene and his colleagues. He concludes (it would be surprising if he hadn’t come to this conclusion) that even newborns are conscious in various complex ways.
Casarotto et al. 2015 measure a Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI) as a simpler proxy for consciousness conceived as integrated information. Tononi is a coauthor on this paper and Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is widely considered to be one of the more convincing extant theories of consciousness. IIT suggests that integrated information is consciousness, though in its most recent formulation consciousness is instead considered to be identical to the maximally-integrated causal ___ (“MICE”), see Koch 2019; Oizumi, et al. 2014.
Tononi and his colleagues acknowledge that measuring MICE or integrated information (\(\Phi\)) in any biologically-complex context is extremely difficult. The PCI was developed as a more tractable means for measuring mammalian brain activity and relies on quantification of electrical activity with sophisticated EEG during transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the brain. PCI is a measure of elasticity of neurons and neuron complexes under perturbation by TMS. It is thought that the less elastic a neuron is the more it is firing and thus contributing to consciousness (Casarotto et al. 2015): “PCI offers a reliable, independently validated stratification of unresponsive patients that has important physiopathological and therapeutic implications. [We found that] the high-PCI subgroup of VS patients may retain a capacity for consciousness that is not expressed in behavior.”
The PCI measures interconnectedness between different parts of the brain, and activity within those information pathways: “PCI directly gauges the ability of many functionally specialized modules of the thalamocortical system (differentiation) to interact rapidly and effectively (integration), thus producing complex patterns of activity.” (Id.)
Some researchers, such as Koch 2019, view the PCI measure as an effective but far from perfect psychometer even in its current state. Koch elaborates on his views on PCI in his 2019 book, The Feeling Of Life Itself , worth quoting at length (Koch 2019, p. 104):
Zap-and-zip [the colloquial name for the PCI technique] does not measure integrated information. While the PCI index is motivated by IIT, it crudely estimates differentiation and integration. Pace IIT, a genuine consciousness meter should measure\(\Phi\)max. Such a \(\Phi\)-meter or phi-meter must causally probe the NCC at the relevant level of spatiotemporal granularity that maximizes integrated information. This can be assessed empirically. A true phi-meter should reflect the waxing and waning of experience during wakefulness and sleep, how consciousness increases in children and teenagers until it reaches its zenith in mature adults with a highly developed sense of self, with, perhaps, an absolute maximum on long-term meditators, before it begins its inevitable decline with age. Such a device would generalize across species, whether or not they have a cortex, or, indeed, any sort of sophisticated nervous system. For now, we are far from such a tool. In the interim, let us celebrate this milestone in the millennia-old mind-body problem.
In sum, PCI and “zap-and-zip” arguably represent a high-water mark for current efforts to measure complex consciousness, and yet PCI remains a relatively crude measure.
Looking to the evolution of consciousness, and what it takes to enjoy consciousness in a form resembling human consciousness, Feinberg and Mallatt 2016 presents a theory of consciousness, which they call the theory of “neurobiological naturalism. They argue the following features are necessary for the presence of consciousness: 1) living processes; 2) multicellularity with a nervous system and a basic core brain; 3) “numerous and neurobiologically unique special neurobiological features of complex nervous systems.” The authors conclude that consciousness is a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging from the explosion of animal complexity in the Cambrian Explosion around 540 million years ago. This theory is so obviously contingent and tautological, offering no explanation as to why these specific features are necessary for consciousness, that I shall not dwell on it further.
  1. Behavioral correlates of consciousness
The behavioral correlates of consciousness (BCC) are a more intuitive and more common manner of assessing the presence and type of consciousness in everyday life and even in a clinical setting. When measuring NCC is not an option, we need to consider behavioral correlates as clues for the presence and type of consciousness. As with measures of the NCC there is no established methodology for using BCC as a measure(s) of consciousness.
At the most general level, we as humans assess the presence and type of consciousness present in other humans multiple times per day through conversations with other humans. Speech and other forms of direct communication are a type of BCC. Because each us uses speech to convey our own thoughts and feelings too often to keep track of we also accept that other humans expressing complex, or even simple, thoughts and feelings through the use of speech are in fact conscious in ways very similar to ourselves. This statement is not revelatory but it is important to state as a baseline approach for assessing the presence of consciousness.
In the AI context and simulation of consciousness – independent of deeper questions about whether AIs can ever be truly conscious rather than merely simulating it, the well-known Turing Test (described as “the imitation game” by Turing himself, Turing 1950) is meant to allow humans to judge the degree of thinking ability (what we would today describe as consciousness), if any, in an AI. The Turing Test was originally proposed to allow human participants to make a specific judgment based on responses from the test subject about the nature of the subject: could it really think? Was it a human or a machine? The Turing Test is a way of using BCC to assess the presence and type of consciousness in AIs through direct communications.
The BCC encompass far more than forms of communication, however.
Cats cannot communicate their states of consciousness with words. The brain architecture in cats is quite different from humans and they have very minimal prefrontal cortex, which is thought to be the center of many higher-order activities of the human brain. But is prefrontal cortex necessary for consciousness?
Cat behavior is complex and readily mappable onto human behavior in many ways. The fact that cats purr, flex their toes and snuggle when petted, in similar ways to humans demonstrating pleasure when physically stimulated (minus the purrs, of course), meow loudly for food when hungry, and stop meowing when fed, demonstrate curiosity or fear about other cats or humans with various types of body language, and many other behaviors that we can easily observe ourselves if we have cats as pets, is fairly convincing evidence, for most of us, that cats are indeed conscious and have a rich emotional life.
LeDoux 2019 argues for a conservative approach to BCC. He argues that the default position for making any determinations about the presence of consciousness should, if possible, explain behaviors without inferring a role for consciousness. I advocate a less conservative view below, which is part of the more recent progressive trend toward treating the study of animal minds in the same or similar ways as we do human minds. This trend is itself based primarily on the obvious strong kinship and similarities between humans and other animals, as well as the well-established fact that biological change occurs slowly and incrementally, abhorring “jumps.”
Donald R. Griffin has examined the nature of animal minds in various works, including his 2001 book, Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness , in which he states (Griffin 2001, p. xiii): “In a sharp break with the traditional conviction that the mental experiences of animals cannot be studied scientifically, some of us have begun to try.” There is now a relatively long history of examining the nature of consciousness in animals and the 20th Century “controversy” over discussions of animal or even human minds, and the soft taboo about studying the mind directly, has justifiably receded into the distance.
  1. Creative correlates of consciousness
Creative output is another source of data for assessing the presence of consciousness. If for whatever reason we can’t examine neural or behavioral correlates of consciousness, we may be able to examine the creative products of consciousness (CCC) for clues. Additionally, in any circumstance where the presence of consciousness is in doubt it will be beneficial to use as many tests of consciousness as are available, including NCC, BCC and CCC.
For example, when we examine ancient architectural structures such as Stonehenge or other megalithic structures, or cave paintings in Europe that have been judged to be as much as 65,000 years old, are we reasonable in judging the creators of these items to be conscious in ways similar to our own? Most of us would say: obviously, yes. We know from experience that it would take high intelligence and consciousness to produce such items today, so we reasonably infer that our ancient ancestors had similar levels of consciousness.
What if we find obviously unnatural artifacts on Mars or other bodies in our solar system? Do we reasonably infer that whatever entities created such artifacts were conscious? It will depend on the artifacts in question, but if we were to find anything remotely similar to human dwellings or machinery on other planets, but which was clearly not human in origin, most of us would reasonably infer that the creators of these artifacts were also conscious.
Closer to home, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has produced increasingly impressive art, with one piece fetching over $400,000 at a 2018 art auction. At what point do reasonable people conclude that sophisticated art creation suggests the presence of some kind of consciousness? To answer this question empirically, we could conduct a kind of “artistic Turing Test” and ask study participants to consider various works of art and say which ones they conclude must have been created by a human. And if AI artwork consistently fools people into thinking it was made by a human, is that good evidence to conclude that the AI is at least in some ways conscious?
I reserve judgment on this issue for now, but as a general observation I agree with Koch 2019 that any AI instantiated in a von Neumann “feedforward” type of computer, which has no feedback processes built-in, as are prevalent in brains, it is highly unlikely that any complex consciousness will be present in any AI that is otherwise impressive in its achievements.
  1. How do we develop a reliable psychometer?
There is not yet any widely-accepted or reliable psychometer, and probably never will be a single device that reliably measures the capacity for consciousness in all circumstances. But various researchers have suggested ideas, including Dehaene, Changeux, Tononi, Koch, Cassarotto, and others.
Demertzi admonishes when assessing the presence of consciousness: “Finding reliable markers indicating the presence or absence of consciousness represents an outstanding open problem for science.” (Demertzi et al. 2019). Demertzi and colleagues, and various other researchers have been working to identify reliable markers, but this is still, as we have seen, a nascent field.
Dehaene 2014 states the problem clearly (p. 211): “[C]ould any brain image ever prove or disprove the existence of a mind?” He answers this question in the affirmative, with various discussions about the neural correlates of consciousness and “signatures of consciousness” (what he considers to be the necessary and sufficient correlates of consciousness), but also recognizes that (p. 214) “no single test will ever prove, once and for all, whether consciousness is present.” He instead recommends a battery of tests be developed to give more confidence about the presence of consciousness in various contexts. His work is focused on human subjects but he also discusses animal consciousness in his book. The present paper is focused on a theoretical framework for measuring the capacity for consciousness in any physical structures.
Neuroscientist Giulio Tononi and his colleague Christof Koch, as discussed above, focus on measuring MICE and “integrated information” as a proxy for measuring the capacity for consciousness. This theory suggests that anything that integrates at least one bit of information has at least a tiny amount of consciousness. A light diode, for example, contains one bit of information and thus has the most rudimentary type of consciousness. With just two possible states, on or off, however, it’s a rather uninteresting kind of consciousness.
Koch 2019, accepting IIT as the best working theory of consciousness extant, raises the possibility of panpsychism expressly, worth quoting at length (Koch 2019 p. 160):
To the extent that I’m discussing the mental with respect to single-cell organisms let alone atoms, I have entered the realm of pure speculation, something I have been trained all my life as a scientist to avoid. Yet three considerations prompt me to cast caution to the wind. First, these ideas are straightforward extensions of IIT – constructed to explain human-level consciousness—to vastly different aspects of physical reality. This is one of the hallmarks of a powerful scientific theory—predicting phenomena by extrapolating to conditions far from the theory’s original remit. There are many precedents—that the passage of time depends on how fast you travel, that spacetime can break down at singularities known as black holes, that people, butterflies, vegetables, and the bacteria in your gut use the same mechanism to store and copy their genetic information, and so on. Second, I admire the elegance and beauty of this prediction. The mental does not appear abruptly out of the physical. As Leibniz expressed it,natura no facit saltus , or nature does not make sudden leaps (Leibniz was, after all, the co-inventor of infinitesimal calculs). The absence of discontinuities is also a bedrock element of Darwinian thought. Intrinsic causal power does away with the challenge of how mind emerges from matter. IIT stipulates that it is there all along.
In my work on General Resonance Theory (GRT) (Hunt 2011, Schooler, Hunt and Schooler 2011, Hunt 2014a, Hunt 2014b Hunt 2019), my collaborators and I share this “panpsychist” foundation with IIT and other panpsychist theories of consciousness. Indeed, Koch wrote the foreword to Hunt 2014b. I accept as a working hypothesis that any physical system has some associated consciousness, however small it may be in the vast majority of cases.
Rather than integrated information as the key measure of consciousness, however, GRT focuses on resonance and synchronization and the degree to which parts of a whole resonate at the same or similar frequencies. Resonance in the case of the human brain generally means shared electric field oscillation rates, such as gamma band synchrony (40-120 Hertz) as one example. (Hunt and Schooler 2019 also speculates that quantum resonance may also play a role in human and other mammalian consciousness, in an interplay with electric field resonance).
A psychometer developed pursuant to GRT would, insofar as it focuses on neural correlates of consciousness, look at the degree of shared resonance of various types (Hunt and Schooler 2019, Hunt 2019b), and resulting information/energy flows, as the measure of consciousness. Humans and other mammals enjoy a particularly rich kind of consciousness, because there are many levels of pervasive shared synchronization throughout the brain, nervous system and body (Hunt 2019c). [Fn 2]
Footnote 2. Information is generally defined as a subjective aspect of the physical world, whereas energy is an objective aspect; but in this context I am using these terms interchangeably because I define information as aspects of energy that we can measure. As such, all physical dynamics consist of nothing more than energy flows, but those energy flows that we can measure may be labeled “information” and quantified under established information theoretic concepts. I will, however, generally refer to “information/energy flows” simply as “information flows” from now on in this paper, for simplicity’s sake.
In our framework more generally, we propose a “weight of the evidence” approach to assessing the presence and nature of consciousness in any particular object of study. We pose a number of “questions,” in all areas of the MCC as described above, to the object of study and it answers in whatever ways it can. Questions can be verbal in nature, or physical probes, or any kind of interaction between the tester and the testee. Based on whatever responses are received, we then make the same kinds of reasonable inferences about the presence and nature of consciousness that we do every day, implicitly, when it comes to other humans or animals.
This question and answer process is meant to be truly general and may apply to any candidate for consciousness, whether it is a human, animal, plant, bacterium, AI or any physical object.
The logical chain of this framework is straightforward: I know I’m conscious; I assume other humans are conscious because they act in various ways like me and do many intelligent things; I engage in similar reasonable inferences when assessing whether various animals are conscious and to what degree; we can use the same process of reasonable inference all the way down the chain of physical complexity. Figure 2 summarizes this approach.
Figure 2. Summary of the suggested approach for assessing the presence and nature of consciousness in any physical structures.