Alongside models and methods, concepts are one of the building blocks of
neuroscientific inquiry. They help researchers to pursue various goals,
such as describing novel patterns in the data, situate these patterns in
existing models, formulate new models or build explanations, e.g., of
how the brain processes sensory information. Often the formation of
novel or reinterpretation of existing concepts can signal major shifts
in how we understand the brain and investigate it scientifically. Yet
not every novel concept or reinterpretation produces such a shift, which
raises the question of when concepts succeed or fail to change our
understanding of the brain. In this paper, we introduce analytical tools
developed by philosophers of science and concepts of brain organization
as examples to discuss when introducing novel, reinterpreting existing
and replacing outdated neuroscientific concepts succeeds or fails. Our
discussion opens up novel avenues for neuroscientists and philosophers
to collaborate around the limits of old and prospects of new concepts
describing how the brain is organized.